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Abstract
Electricity markets vary greatly across jurisdictions, in terms of reg-
ulatory institutions, cost levels and environmental impacts. Integrating
such diﬀerent markets can lead to significant changes. This paper consid-
ers two jurisdictions − one with a regulated monopoly selling at average
cost and one with a competitive market — and compares three diﬀerent
institutional regimes: autarky, a mixed-market structure with trade and
a fully integrated market, where electricity is sold at marginal cost. We
show that, in the second regime, the regulated monopoly always exports
toward the jurisdiction pricing at marginal cost, up to inducing productive
ineﬃciencies. By contrast, a shift from the second to the third regime, i.e.
"integrated deregulation" yields a decrease in overall consumption. We
identify the exact conditions under which the shift from one regime to the
other results in environmental gains.
J.E.L. Classification: F14, F15, L50, L94, Q52, Q56.
Keywords: Market Integration; Regulation; Electricity Trade; Environ-
mental Impacts.
1 Introduction
Electricity market reforms aim at increasing welfare by changing how price and
investment decisions are made. Most reforms were designed with only one ju-
risdiction in mind, e.g. England, California or Ontario. However, increased
market access over diﬀerent jurisdictions - such as in the Nordic countries or in
the United States, where Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) are active -
can also have important welfare impacts. This paper is concerned with such in-
tegration reforms and their consequences upon price levels and the environment.
The motivation for this contribution comes from the observation that there is
little research explicitly characterizing electricity market integration outcomes.
As Blumsack (2007) puts it, "neither industry nor academia has produced a
definitive study of the costs and benefits of RTO markets and regional grid inte-
gration". While we do not provide such a definitive study on electricity market
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integration, nor are we conducting a cost-benefit analysis, our contribution is
to present important results with respect to change in market outcomes (price,
production and emission levels) when two electricity markets integrate. Such
results are otherwise absent from the literature and help assessing the benefits
of integration.
We directly build on Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010), where we have
shown that electricity trade across regions is likely to increase environmental ex-
ternalities, possibly preventing market integration to be welfare enhancing. We
take a further step in the study of electricity market integration by looking at
the role of regulatory institutions. More specifically, we compare the case where
one of the trading jurisdictions maintains average cost pricing regulation over
its internal market to the case where market integration also comes with a shift
to marginal cost pricing in both jurisdictions.
Our paper evidences that institutions matter. In particular, we show that, if
market integration is not accompanied by deregulation, the regulated monop-
olist always finds it profitable to export toward the other jurisdiction. This
happens whenever average costs are increasing because, by doing so, the mo-
nopolist is able to induce a raise in the cost-based regulated price. As a result,
market integration is likely to introduce productive ineﬃciencies, especially if
the regulated jurisdiction is neighbour to a relatively inexpensive market.
By contrast, deregulation within an integrated market always leads to a decrease
in overall consumption. Environmental externalities consequently decrease, un-
less the change to marginal cost pricing leads the importing (initially deregu-
lated) jurisdiction to increase its production and the latter happens to have a
higher carbon content.
In order to study these electricity integration outcomes, we propose a two-
jurisdiction electricity market model and consider three diﬀerent regimes. More
specifically:
Regime 1 The two jurisdictions are in autarky (no interconnection). In one
jurisdiction, price is equal to average cost (through regulation, including
a return on investment). In the other one, price is equal to marginal cost
(through a competitive market, with price-taking firms).
Regime 2 The two jurisdictions trade through an unlimited interconnection.
However, (internal) market structures are as in regime 1: one jurisdiction
prices at average cost, in the other, price is equal to marginal cost.
Regime 3 The two jurisdictions are "fully integrated": they again trade through
an unlimited interconnection and they both price at marginal cost.
The assumption of unlimited interconnection is deliberately maintained through-
out the paper. This is obviously unrealistic, although real interconnections are
far from being congested all the time; see for instance Pineau and Lefevbre
(2009) for a North American example. It however allows us i) to limit the num-
ber of cases and subcases that would follow from having the constraint attached
to the limited interconnection capacity binding or not, ii) to bring out more
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clearcut results and ultimately, iii) to identify in which direction market forces
are pushing.
The three regimes represent policy options for many jurisdictions that still
regulate electricity price using average cost principles, while their neighbors
have prices closer to the marginal cost of electricity. For instance, in the United
States, many states enjoy low regulated power prices, even if they share a border
with a higher-price, deregulated, jurisdiction. This is the case of Idaho where,
in 2009, the regulated industrial electricity price was 5.17 cents per kWh (EIA,
2011) - thanks to its abundant hydropower production (79% of total generation).
In the neighboring Nevada, electricity was competitively sold at 7.97 cents, on
average, to the industry. The share of generation coming from coal and natural
gas, 88%, largely explains the diﬀerence (EIA, 2011). Similarly, in Canada,
electricity in the provinces of Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia is sold
at a (regulated) price almost half the level of the (competitive) prices prevailing
in Ontario and Alberta (Pineau, 2009). This can be explained by the larger
share of relatively cheap hydropower available in these provinces, sold under
cost-based rates, very similar to an average-cost pricing regulation. In Europe,
the situation is similar between France (lower cost nuclear power) and the United
Kingdom (with higher cost fossil fuel generation).
We are particularly interested in analyzing the consequences of adopting one
of the three diﬀerent policy options, upon prices, consumption and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. The rest of the paper is divided into three sections.
In section 2, we provide a literature review. Section 3 oﬀers an analysis of
electricity trade and regime changes over two jurisdictions, along with some
theoretical results. A conclusion follows.
2 Electricity Market Integration Literature Re-
view
Surprisingly, despite major liberalization reforms and electricity market inte-
gration initiatives, few contributions formally look at market outcomes when
diﬀerent jurisdictions integrate their electricity markets. Price and production
levels are usually not the focus of integration studies. It is rather the volume of
trade, the amount of reserve margins, the eﬃciency of power plants and invest-
ment incentives that are considered. See for instance Müller-Jentsch (2005) or
Hooper and Medvedev (2009) for discussions on the benefits of electricity mar-
ket integration. Empirical studies conducted in the US for the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission on RTO (IFC Consulting, 2002) or on the PJM market
(Krapels and Flemming, 2005) are mostly looking at these same issues, leaving
aside regional variations in economic outcomes (even if the topic is briefly men-
tioned in IFC Consulting, 2002). This is could probably be explained because
they do not want to deal with "native load commitments", i.e. the obligation to
serve local consumers before being able to sell elsewhere, even at a higher price.
For instance, Blumsack (2007), in his attempt to measure the benefits and costs
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of regional electricity market integration, prefers to leave aside "institutional
changes associated with restructuring, such as the movement away from cost-
based rates". Our paper directly deals with such a movement. It provides a
"systematic analysis of the eﬀect of competition reforms on electricity prices",
something Joskow (2008a) observes as being seldom done.
Understanding diﬀerences in outcomes for the various jurisdictions poten-
tially involved in electricity market integration is key for their success, because
groups losing in the integration process may resist any change. Indeed, Ben-
jamin (2007) explains the opposition to "standard market design" in the US
South by the fear "that broader regional markets enabled by it would result
in export of the region’s cheap power to higher-priced areas". Similarly, van
den Hoven and Froschauer (2004) illustrate this problem in their analysis of the
French and Canadian cases. More recently, Finon (2008) raises the question
of electricity market integration from a consumer’s perspective, in France. He
questions the benefit of such integration for consumers, as they may face higher
prices. Although these papers provide intuition for the problem they describe,
they do not formalize the resulting market outcomes, nor do they rigorously
characterize price and quantity outcomes of integration.
In the vast literature on restructuring of the electricity sector, Newbery
(2000) or Stoft (2002) oﬀer very good theoretical frameworks. However, neither
discusses the consequences of integrating diﬀerent electricity markets. Theo-
retical and applied economic results on electricity market integration are not
common in the literature, despite its importance. Joskow (2008b) calls for a US
"comprehensive national electricity policy framework" to adequately tackle the
climate change challenge, among other benefits. In such a framework, electricity
market would be more integrated. Electricity market integration is currently
happening in Europe (Meeus and Belmans, 2008) and promoted across the world
(UN, 2006). See also Pineau (2008) for a discussion of electricity market inte-
gration in West Africa.
Integration of diﬀerent jurisdictions takes place through increased electric-
ity trade, as studied by Aune et al. (2004), Haaparanta (2004) and von der
Fehr and Sandsbråten (1997). However, these papers do not look at regional
welfare impacts, but on induced technological and industrial changes following
integration. Furthermore, they leave aside all political economy questions on
whether increased trade could receive support from consumers and producers
in the concerned jurisdictions. Bye and Holmøy (2010) study the impact of an
industrial electricity price increase in the Norway through a computable general
equilibrium model, but leave aside regional outcomes.
Chen (2009) studies how a cap-and-trade system could lead to CO2 leakages
in the PJM electricity market, integrating six diﬀerent states (Maryland, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Delaware and Virginia as well as Wash-
ington, DC). Our paper also looks at emissions from diﬀerent jurisdictions, but
in a context where they are not already sharing the same market structure.
We build on Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010), where conditions under
which trade leads to damaging environmental impacts are characterized. Re-
garding environmental eﬀects, our contribution, in this paper, is twofold. We
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first extend our previous results to the case where one of the jurisdictions is
regulated. Second, we identify the circumstances under which, in an integrated
market, the shift to marginal cost pricing of a previously regulated jurisdiction
is environmentally beneficial.
Recently, integration through increasing transmission capacity between two
markets and its welfare impacts was studied by Sauma and Oren (2009). Their
analysis is mostly concerned with the ownership of financial transmission rights
(FTRs), market power and its impacts on investment in new transmission. Our
paper looks at a more general situation, where two markets have diﬀerent cost
structures and price regulation. Our analysis is not centered on investment in
transmission capacity nor on market power, but on specific market outcomes,
including environmental ones. To some extent, it builds on Bernard and Chatel
(1985), where marginal cost pricing is introduced in a single jurisdiction where
electricity production mostly comes from hydropower. However, again, our
focus is more on the impact of integrating markets than on the pricing structure
change within one market only.
Political economy questions on the distribution of gains and losses after in-
troducing trade have received attention in the general trade literature. Dixit
and Norman (1986) look at a Pareto superior outcome from free trade without
lump-sum compensation. They suggest using taxes and subsidies to redistrib-
ute gains. Davidson et al. (2007) and Brusco and Hopenhayn (2007) follow this
avenue and study transfer schemes that will lead to political support for the
removal of all trade barriers and further market integration, in the general case.
Such political and trade issues are increasingly linked with environmental con-
siderations. Furthermore, environmental policy is becoming a political question,
and voters have diﬀerent sensitivities to it. Questions of political parties gain-
ing votes through earmarked environmental spending are dealt with in Anesi
(2006). Anesi and De Donder (2008) look at the interplay between environ-
mental issues and other ones in the political game played by parties. Although
our model would oﬀer a good basis for such analysis we do not expand on the
political economy questions in this paper. These issues are however key for the
successful implementation of market integration reforms.
3 Trade in Electricity Markets
3.1 The model
Consider two jurisdictions, A and M (for Average cost pricing and M arginal
cost pricing, respectively), characterized by dissimilar features regarding their
electricity sector. More precisely, we assume that there is a single provider in A
which is regulated and prices at the average cost of production. Throughout the
paper, we assume that the industry is beyond the eﬃciency point and exhibits
decreasing returns to scale. In other words, average cost in A is assumed to be
increasing. By contrast, electricity in M is sold at marginal cost. Moreover, we
assume that jurisdictions A and M also diﬀer in two other dimensions: their
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production costs and the environmental impact of their production technologies.
We also assume that marginal costs in M are always higher than average costs
in A. Otherwise, unbounded trade from M to A would lead to the complete
shutdown of production in A, a case we wish to exclude because of its very
limited relevance.
Let pA
¡
XDA
¢
and pM
¡
XDM
¢
denote the (inverse) demand functions of the
respective jurisdictions, where XDA and X
D
M are the quantities consumed in A
and M . Let CA
¡
XSA
¢
and CM
¡
XSM
¢
be the respective production costs for XSA
and XSM , the quantities supplied. We assume that both cost functions CA (·)
and CM (·) are increasing and convex in their argument. Similarly, let EA
¡
XSA
¢
and EM
¡
XSM
¢
denote the environmental impact (emissions) of production in
each jurisdiction. Emissions Ej , j = A,M increase with production Xj . It is a
"public bad" whose damage functions Dj (E), j = A,M are increasing in their
argument E ≡ EA +EM .
When jurisdictions A and M trade, Xt denotes the quantity flowing from A
to M , with this convention: XSA = X
D
A +Xt and X
S
M = X
D
M −Xt. We do not
consider the case where trade goes from M to A, as we assume higher costs in
M .
3.2 Regime 1: Mixed-market structure in autarky
If both markets run in autarky (Xt = 0) and there is no shortage, equilibrium
quantities X1A = X
S
A = X
D
A and X
1
M = X
S
M = X
D
M are defined by the implicit
equations1
pA
¡
X1A
¢
=
CA
¡
X1A
¢
X1A
, (1)
pM
¡
X1M
¢
= C0M
¡
X1M
¢
. (2)
Note that both equations follow from “profit maximization”.2 As a result of
supply obligation, the provider in A must produce as to exactly match consumer
demand XDA , which given the pricing rule imposed in A is defined by Eq. (1).
By contrast, producers in M are assumed to be price takers, hence Eq. (2),
which follows from equalizing marginal returns to marginal costs.
Note that, because we assumed the average cost function CA (X) /X to be
increasing, average cost pricing in jurisdiction A is not socially eﬃcient. This is
true, even abstracting from the possibility of non-linear pricing3 and ignoring the
environmental dimension. More precisely, prices are ineﬃciently low. Instead,
marginal cost pricing in M is eﬃcient as long as environmental damages are
1Superscripts 1, 2 and 3 are used to refer to Regimes 1, 2 and 3, respectively. When there
is no ambiguity, these superscripts are dropped.
2 In all the paper, we consider the production capabilities to be given. This says that we
consider only short-term profit-maximization by output adjustments and ignore long-term
issues like capital investment. For traditional capacity expansion models under cost-based
regulation, see Bates and Fraser (1974) or Kahn (1988), among many others.
3We thank one of the referees for pointing that out.
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neglected. However, if environmental impacts are accounted for, prices are also
too low.
3.3 Regime 2: Mixed-market structure with trade
Consider now a situation where there is some trade between the two jurisdic-
tions. Yet, we assume that, while the A-producer may sell in theM -market, the
quantities involved are small enough for the A-producer not to have any market
power in jurisdiction M .
3.3.1 Trade flows
Recall that pA
¡
XDA
¢
denotes the inverse demand function in jurisdictionA.Given
the price-taking behavior in market M , the profits of the A-monopolist are its
revenue in A minus its total cost, plus the trade revenues. These profits write:
πA
¡
XSA,Xt
¢
= pA
¡
XSA −Xt
¢ £
XSA −Xt
¤
− CA
¡
XSA
¢
+ pMXt. (3)
The pricing rule also imposes that
pA
¡
XSA −Xt
¢
=
CA
¡
XSA
¢
XSA
. (4)
The latter equation determines implicitly XSA, for any level of Xt.
By diﬀerentiating with respect to Xt, one obtains
0 <
dXSA
dXt
=
−p0AXSA
C 0A
¡
XSA
¢
−
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
− p0AXSA
< 1. (5)
In words, supply increases with exports, but less than proportionally. Indeed,
as exports grow, the price pA =
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
grows and induces a decrease
in internal demand XDA = X
S
A −Xt.
The A-monopolist chooses its export Xt as to maximize its profits. Note
that, thanks to Eq. (4) , these profits write
πA
¡
XSA,Xt
¢
=
Ã
pM −
CA
¡
XSA
¢
XSA
!
Xt. (6)
We thus have
dπA
dXt
=
∂πA
∂Xt
+
∂πA
∂XSA
dXSA
dXt
=
Ã
pM −
CA
¡
XSA
¢
XSA
!
(7)
+
"
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
−
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
−
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
− p0AXSA
#
p0AXt.
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It follows that, as long as pM = C 0M
¡
XS
¢
> pA =
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
, which
we assumed, the A-monopolist has always an interest to export toward the M
jurisdiction. Formally:
Proposition 1 Provided that pM > pA and pA =
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
, profit-
maximization yields the A-monopolist to always export toward jurisdiction M .
Remark 2 This holds true even when pM = C0M
¡
XSM
¢
is lower than C0A
¡
XSA
¢
.
This remark says that the A-monopolist may export at a price lower than
its marginal production cost. The intuition for this comes from the fact that
the marginal unit is sold below its production cost also in jurisdiction A. Selling
in the export market raises production and therefore pA. The loss made in the
export market is more than compensated by the resulting reduction in internal
demand, over which, marginally, an even greater loss was made.
In fact, absent restrictions on trade, (or provided the transmission capacity is
not reached), one can show4 that, at equilibrium:
C 0A
¡
XSA
¢
−C 0M
¡
XSM
¢
=
"
C 0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA − p0A
¡
XSA −Xt
¢
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA − p0AXSA
# ¡
C 0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA
¢
> 0.
(8)
In words, production is not distributed eﬃciently across producers.
3.3.2 Eﬀects on prices and quantities
As just shown, the A-monopolist always has an incentive to export towards
jurisdiction M. It follows that the introduction of trade results in an increase
in pA and a decrease in pM . We also know that, despite the demand reduction
in jurisdiction A, the supply XSA increases. By contrast X
S
M decreases but less
than Xt, so that XDM increases. More precisely, by diﬀerentiating the equality
pM
¡
XSM +Xt
¢
= C 0M
¡
XSM
¢
, (9)
we obtain:
−1 < dX
S
M
dXt
=
p0M
C 00M
¡
XSM
¢
− p0M
< 0. (10)
This, together with the analytical expression of
¡
dXSA/dXt
¢
in (5) allows us to
establish the precise conditions under which electricity trade results in a higher
overall consumption. We find:
Proposition 3 Provided that pM > pA and pA =
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
, allowing
trade between the two jurisdictions has the following impacts: price and pro-
duction increase in A and decrease in M . Total supply increases with trade
iﬀ
εM
£
1 +
¡
Xt/XDA
¢¤
εA
£
1−
¡
Xt/XDM
¢¤ > ηM
Ã
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA
pA
!
,
4This follows directly from rewriting equation (7) by setting (dπA/dXt) = 0
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where εA and εM stand respectively for the (absolute value of the) price elasticity
of demand in jurisdictions A and M,while ηM denotes the price elasticity of
supply in jurisdiction M.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
3.3.3 Environmental impact
Environmental impacts of trade between two jurisdictions is already analyzed
in Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010). Supply and demand elasticity con-
ditions under which trade between two jurisdictions leads to greater or lower
overall production levels are indeed provided. We complement this analysis with
the following result:
Proposition 4 Within a jurisdiction, emissions increase with exports and de-
crease with imports. Since when one jurisdiction is exporting, the other is im-
porting, the overall environmental impact of trade is ambiguous. This ambiguity
is present even if the low-emission jurisdiction is exporting. More precisely,
trade is environmentally adverse if and only if:
εM
KM
¡
1−Xt/XDM
¢ 1
ηM
− εA
KA
¡
1 +Xt/XDA
¢ ÃC 0A ¡XSA¢− pA
pA
!
>
KM −KA
KAKM
¡
1−Xt/XDM
¢ ¡
1 +Xt/XDA
¢
,
where KA and KM denote the carbon content of the marginal units of power
produced in jurisdictions A and M respectively.
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Remark 5 If the supply in jurisdiction M is almost inelastic (that is ηM ' 0),
say, because this jurisdiction is under capacity, trade is likely to have a negative
environmental impact.
Remark 6 If trade results in large environmental damages, it may even yield to
a decrease in social welfare. Again, for more specific results on this, see Billette
de Villemeur and Pineau (2010).
3.4 Regime 3: Fully integrated markets
Assume now that A and M are fully integrated and that, in both jurisdictions,
producers are price-takers and sell at marginal cost. Ignoring environmental
costs, both A and M -markets are now “eﬃcient”. Accounting for environmen-
tal damages, electric power is however underpriced in both jurisdictions.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two possible market outcomes under the mixed-market
structure with trade (Regime 2) and under the "fully integrated" situation
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(Regime 3). Recall that we assumed no restrictions in trade across jurisdic-
tion. Since, in Regime 3, both jurisdictions price at marginal cost, they end up
with a common price p3A = p
3
M .
In Figure 1, the move from Regime 2 to Regime 3 leads to a decrease of
Xt (X3t ≤ X2t ), while in Figure 2 Xt increases. In both cases, p3A increases.
However, p3M increases in the first case (Figure 1), while it decreases in the
second case (Figure 2). These two cases are further discussed in Proposition 7.
Figure 1 here
Figure 2 here
3.4.1 Eﬀects on prices and quantities
Assuming no restriction on trade across jurisdictions, equilibrium prices write
simply as:
p3A = p
3
M = C
0
A
¡
XD3A +Xt
¢
= C0M
¡
XD3M −Xt
¢
. (11)
To compare with autarky, note that Xt ≥ 0 means that p3M ≤ p1M , simply
because marginal costs are increasing. The comparison between p1A and p
3
A is
also straightforward. As Xt ≥ 0, it must be the case that p3A ≥ p1A.
To see that, observe that
p1A =
CA
¡
X1A
¢
X1A
< C 0A
¡
X1A
¢
,
because the capacity of the A-monopolist is already used beyond its eﬃcient
point in autarky. Suppose p1A > p
3
A and Xt ≥ 0 and look for a contradiction.
From p1A > p
3
A, it follows X
D1
A < X
D3
A hence C
0
A
¡
X1A
¢
< C 0A
¡
XD3A +Xt
¢
be-
cause Xt ≥ 0. Since p1A < C 0A
¡
X1A
¢
, we finally get p1A < C
0
A
¡
XD3A +Xt
¢
= p3A,
a contradiction. Thus, if jurisdiction A exports after a shift from autarky to
fully integrated markets, it must be the case that p3A ≥ p1A. In words, consumers
in jurisdiction A see a price increase.
To sum up, if Xt ≥ 0,which we assumed,
p1A ≤ p3A = p3M ≤ p1M .
It is however the comparison with the mixed-market structure that is the
most interesting, as few markets directly move from autarky to a common mar-
ginal cost pricing structure. A very interesting proposition can indeed be proven
for this latter type of market structure change:
Proposition 7 When two jurisdictions A and M (respectively pricing at aver-
age cost and at marginal cost) move into a common market structure where all
firms are price-takers (hence price at marginal costs), total consumption always
decreases. There are two cases. Either the price increases in both jurisdictions,
in which case consumption decreases in both jurisdictions; or the price decreases
inM and increases in A in which case production decreases in both jurisdiction.
Proof. See appendix A.3.
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Remark 8 Although total consumption decreases when shifting from a mixed
structured market (where one jurisdiction is regulated while the other has a
competitive market) to an integrated market where all firms are price-takers,
consumption in Regime 3 nevertheless exceeds the socially optimal level. In
fact, marginal pricing does not induce eﬃciency in presence of externalities.
3.4.2 Environmental impact
As evidenced above, the shift toward an integrated market with price-taker firms
in both jurisdictions may result in two diﬀerent cases, as illustrated in Figures
1 and 2. Either the price increase experimented by the now deregulated juris-
diction A propagates to jurisdiction M (Figure 1), or jurisdiction M observes a
price decrease, as a result of reduced consumption in A and a larger exported
quantity Xt (Figure 2). For what regards environmental eﬀects, we are able to
prove:
Proposition 9 When two jurisdictions A and M (respectively pricing at av-
erage cost and at marginal cost) move into a common market structure where
all firms are price-takers (hence price at marginal costs), emissions always de-
crease as long as the carbon content of production in jurisdiction M is not
strictly higher than the carbon content of jurisdiction A’s production.
Moreover, emissions decrease in both jurisdictions whenever the shift to a com-
petitive market results in a price decrease in jurisdiction M. Formally, if p3M ≤
p2M , then
∆EM = EM
¡
XD3M −X3t
¢
−EM
¡
XD2M −X2t
¢
≤ 0,
∆EA = EA
¡
XD3A +X
3
t
¢
−EA
¡
XD2A +X
2
t
¢
≤ 0.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
Remark 10 Both prices p3M and p
3
A nevertheless remain strictly below their
socially optimal values as they do not account for environmental damages.
4 Conclusion
Although electricity market integration is promoted across the word, no formal
analysis of its consequences in terms of prices and quantities was available so far
in the literature. We provide results on these issues, with their environmental
implications.
We propose a generic electricity market model involving two jurisdictions,
and study these jurisdictions in three diﬀerent institutional regimes. In the first
regime, one jurisdiction is pricing at average production cost, while the other
prices at marginal cost. No trade happens between them. In the second regime,
trade is introduced. In the third regime, marginal cost pricing prevails in both
jurisdictions.
We are able to show that a move from Regime 1 to Regime 2 leads to opposite
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price and consumption change in the two jurisdictions, so that the overall eﬀect
on the combined consumption level depends on specific price elasticities in both
jurisdictions. Obviously, the overall environmental impact is also ambiguous
and depends on the marginal emission rates of both jurisdictions. More inter-
estingly, we evidence that the asymmetry in pricing policies results in productive
ineﬃciencies, the regulated monopolist having excessive incentives to export.
In a shift from Regime 2 to Regime 3 (marginal cost pricing in both jurisdic-
tions), we show that total consumption always decreases, even if the price in
the importing jurisdiction can either increase or decrease. This global consump-
tion reduction always results in less emissions, unless the importing jurisdiction
increases its production and this production has a higher carbon content than
the exporting jurisdiction’s production. This may happen if the exporting ju-
risdiction was trading large quantities in Regime 2, which becomes largely un-
profitable after the shift to Regime 3, leading to a higher production in the
importing jurisdiction.
The contribution of this paper is thus to provide clear evidence that electric-
ity market integration generally calls for the adoption of marginal cost pricing
in all jurisdictions. It also unveils the complex picture attached to such changes.
Price movements are ambiguous for the importing jurisdiction and environmen-
tal impacts also depend on specific generation characteristics. Empirical studies
are required to assess these impacts in more specific contexts. Global welfare
impacts of electricity market integration depend on the level of the environmen-
tal damages involved in electricity generation and are not studied here. Further
research avenues include deeper distributional analysis of regime changes and
the study of transmission capacity, the impact of transmission costs on prices,
profits and trade volumes.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 11 (3) Provided that pM > pA and pA =
£
CA
¡
XSA
¢
/XSA
¤
, al-
lowing trade between the two jurisdictions has the following impacts: price and
production increase in A and decrease in M . Total supply increase with trade
iﬀ
εM
£
1 +
¡
Xt/XDA
¢¤
εA
£
1−
¡
Xt/XDM
¢¤ > ηM
Ã
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA
pA
!
,
where εA and εM stand respectively for the (absolute value of the) price elastic-
ity of demand in jurisdiction A and jurisdiction M,while ηM denote the price
elasticity of supply in jurisdiction M.
Proof. As already evidenced, by diﬀerentiating equation (4)(average cost pric-
ing rule), it is possible to obtain an analytical expression for
¡
dXSA/dXt
¢
, namely
equation (5) . The latter can be rewritten as
dXSA
dXt
=
1 +Xt/XDA
1 +Xt/XDA + εA
¡
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA
¢
/pA
, (12)
where
εA =
pA
XDA
µ
−dXDA
dpA
¶
stands for the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand in jurisdiction
A.
Similarly, by diﬀerentiating equation (9)(marginal cost pricing), we already ob-
tained an analytical expression for
¡
dXSM/dXt
¢
, namely equation (10) . The
latter can be rewritten as
dXSM
dXt
=
−
¡
1−Xt/XDM
¢
1−Xt/XDM + (εM/ηM )
, (13)
where
εM =
pM
XDM
µ
−dXDM
dpM
¶
and ηM =
pM
XSM
µ
dXSM
dpM
¶
stand respectively for the (absolute value of the) price elasticity of demand and
the price elasticity of the supply in jurisdiction M .
Combining both (12) and (13) allows to establish that a marginal increase in
trade result in an increased total supply if and only if
εM
£
1 +
¡
Xt/XDA
¢¤
εA
£
1−
¡
Xt/XDM
¢¤ > ηM
Ã
C0A
¡
XSA
¢
− pA
pA
!
.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 12 (4) Within a jurisdiction, emissions increase with exports and
decrease with imports. Since when one jurisdiction is exporting, the other is im-
porting, the overall environmental impact of trade is ambiguous. This ambiguity
is present even if the low-emission jurisdiction is exporting.
From an environmental point of view, trade has a threefold eﬀect. We know
that X2t ≥ 0, so that p2M ≤ p1M . First, this decrease in pM induces a decrease
in supply by M -producers. Formally, from the monotonicity of C 0M (·), we have
XS2M = X
D2
M − X2t ≤ X1M . Thus, there is an environmental gain made upon
M -generated emissions
∆EM = EM
¡
XD2M −X2t
¢
−EM
¡
X1M
¢
≤ 0. (14)
Second, this decrease in pM also induces an increase in demand byM -consumers.
Formally, XD2M ≥ X1M . This increase is met by the quantity X2t supplied by the
A-producer. Third, as already mentioned, this increase in production by the A-
monopolist leads in turn to an increase in pA, since CA (X) /X is assumed to be
increasing. Thus, the increase in A-production due to trade is mitigated by the
decrease in demand by A-consumers. However, in any case, XS2A = X
D2
A +X
2
t ≥
X1A. Assume this is not the case and look for a contradiction. If the equilibrium
A-production XS2A = X
D2
A +X
2
t is strictly lower than X
1
A, the price p
2
A is strictly
smaller than p1A because average costs are increasing. As a result of this decrease
in price, A-consumption increases. Formally XD2A ≥ X1A, which contradicts
XD2A +X
2
t < X1A. Thus X
S2
A = X
D2
A +X
2
t ≥ X1A and the environmental impact
in A increases with trade:
∆EA = EA
¡
XD2A +X
2
t
¢
−EA
¡
X1A
¢
≥ 0. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) make it clear that, even if marginal costs and marginal
environmental impact are smaller in A (the exporting jurisdiction) than in M
(the importing jurisdiction), the introduction of trade may not be welfare en-
hancing. This would be case if the introduction of trade were mostly increasing
export from A while barely reducing production in M . Expressions (12) and
(13) make it clear that this follows in particular from having an inelastic supply
in jurisdiction M.
More precisely, let KA and KM denote the carbon content of a marginal
electricity unit as produced in jurisdiction A and jurisdiction M respectively.
Expressions (12) and (13) allow to compute the carbon impact of an additional
traded electricity unit Xt. Straightforward calculations allow to evidence that
trade is environmentally adverse whenever
εM
KM
¡
1−Xt/XDM
¢ 1
ηM
− εA
KA
¡
1 +Xt/XDA
¢ ÃC 0A ¡XSA¢− pA
pA
!
>
KM −KA
KAKM
¡
1−Xt/XDM
¢ ¡
1 +Xt/XDA
¢
.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 13 (7) When two jurisdictions A and M (respectively pricing at
average cost and at marginal cost) move into a common market structure where
all firms are price-takers (hence price at marginal costs), total consumption
always decreases. There are two cases. Either the price increases in both ju-
risdictions, in which case consumption decreases in both jurisdictions; or the
price decrease in M and increase in A in which case production decreases in
both jurisdiction.
We know from our assumptions that p2A < p
2
M and X
2
t ≥ 0. Absent con-
straints on trade (i.e. provided the capacity constraints are not binding), there
are theoretically three possible cases, depending upon whether the (common)
price p3A = p
3
M is smaller than p
2
A, larger than p
2
M , or in-between the prices p
2
A
and p2M .
It is easy to exclude the first case. In fact, p3M < p
2
M implies X
S3
M < X
S2
M
and XD3M > X
D2
M , or equivalently, X
S3
M +X
3
t > XS2M +X
2
t . This implies in turn
that X3t −X2t > XS2M −XS3M > 0. Similarly, p3A ≤ p2A implies XD3A ≥ XD2A . Thus
XS3A = X
D3
A + X
3
t > XD2A + X
2
t = XS2A . Production increases in jurisdiction
A. It follows that p3A = C
0
A
¡
XS3A
¢
≥ C 0A
¡
XS2A
¢
> CA
¡
XS2A
¢
/XS2A = p
2
A, a
contradiction.
Consider now the second case, that is, assume that
p3A = p
3
M ≥ p2M .
From p3M ≥ p2M , it follows that XS3M ≥ XS2M : production increases in jurisdiction
M. We also know that XD3M ≤ XD2M which implies in turn that X3t ≤ X2t . From
p3A > p
2
A we have X
D3
A < X
D2
A . As a result X
S3
A = X
D3
A +X
3
t < X
D2
A +X
2
t =
XS2A . Production decreases in jurisdiction A. However, since both p
3
A ≥ p2A and
p3M ≥ p2M consumption decreases in both jurisdiction.
Consider now the third case
p2A < p
3
A = p
3
M < p
2
M .
From p3M < p
2
M , it follows that X
S3
M < X
S2
M : production decreases in juris-
diction M. Suppose that, by contrast, production increases in jurisdiction A
and look for a contradiction. From (8) , we know that C 0A
¡
XS2A
¢
> C 0M
¡
XS2M
¢
.
Thus XS3A > X
S2
A would imply that C
0
M
¡
XS3M
¢
= C 0A
¡
XS3A
¢
> C 0A
¡
XS2A
¢
>
C 0M
¡
XS2M
¢
, contradicting XS3M < X
S2
M . It follows that production decreases in
both jurisdiction, despite consumption increases in jurisdiction M .
It is plain that in both cases, total consumption is always decreasing.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 9
Proposition 14 When two jurisdictions A and M (respectively pricing at av-
erage cost and at marginal cost) move into a common market structure where
all firms are price-takers (hence price at marginal costs), emissions always de-
crease as long as the carbon content of production in jurisdiction M is not
17
strictly higher than the carbon content of jurisdiction A’s production.
Moreover, emissions decrease in both jurisdictions whenever the shift to a com-
petitive market result in a price decrease in jurisdiction M. Formally, if p3M ≤
p2M , then
∆EM = EM
¡
XD3M −X3t
¢
−EM
¡
XD2M −X2t
¢
≤ 0,
∆EA = EA
¡
XD3A +X
3
t
¢
−EA
¡
XD2A +X
2
t
¢
≤ 0.
As shown in Proposition 7, the price in jurisdiction M may either increase
or decrease as a result to a shift to an integrated competitive market. If the
price increases, that is p3M > p
2
M , then production increases in jurisdiction M.
As long as the production in the latter jurisdiction is not polluting strictly more
than that of jurisdiction A, emissions decreases as total consumption decreases
and the production mix has a lower or equal carbon content.
If instead price decreases, that is p3M < p
2
M , then production has been shown
to decrease in both jurisdictions. It is plain that the resulting emissions also
decrease.
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Figure 1: Case 1 - Price after full integration is above the price that prevailed
in both jurisdictions, when A was regulated
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Figure 2: Case 2 - Price after full integration is in-between the two prevailing
prices when jurisdiction A was regulated.
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